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Abstract: The problem of key management is an information security issue at the
core of any cryptographic protocol where identity is involved (e.g. encryption, digital
signature). In particular for the case of online voting, it is critical to ensure that no
single actor (or small group of colluding actors) can impact the result of the election
nor break the secrecy of the ballot.
The concept of threshold encryption is present at the core of many Multi-Party Com-
putation (MPC) protocols, even more so in the scenario of online voting protocols. On
the other hand, the generic key management problem has led to the design of certiﬁably
secure hardware for cryptographic purposes. There are three families of these kind of
designed for security devices: Hardware Security Modules (HSMs), Trusted Platform
Modules (TPMs) and smart cards.
Since smart cards both oﬀer reasonable prices and expose an API for development,
this document evaluates diﬀerent approaches to implement threshold encryption over
smart cards to support an electoral process.
Keywords: online voting, key management, threshold cryptography, smart cards,
untrusted dealer
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1 Introduction
This thesis describes the design process of a solution to enable key storage that can be
used to hold legally binding electoral processes.
The use of information technologies to support elections enables voting processes
to provide proofs of transparency to voters that are more reliable than any traditional
system, at the expense of clarity: the level of previous knowledge required to understand
the nature and reliability of a cryptographic model is higher and more speciﬁc than it
would be for paper ballot, to name an example.
As it is to be expected, the implementation of cryptographic protocols for the speciﬁc
scenario of electronic voting inherits all the concerns that need to be addressed for any
cryptographic implementation: e.g. the selection of suitable parameters and the speciﬁc
algorithms, the decision of using well-proven libraries against implementing the algorithms
from scratch, identifying a suitable randomness generator and extracting randomness
from it adequately, or protecting the secret key used in the algorithm.
The latter will be the major problem addressed during this work. The present doc-
ument will explore the problem of key storage in general, and its particularities within
the online voting scenario. It analyzes the viability of introducing threshold encryption
schemes using smart cards as a platform for security critical operations. As a mech-
anism to validate the approach proposed, this document evaluates its suitability within
the Estonian Internet Voting scheme, which has been used for legally binding elections
throughout more than a decade.
This document presents an overview of the general problem of key management on
chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents the speciﬁc key management requirements within an online
voting scenario, using the experience of the Estonian Internet Voting scheme as a use case.
A qualitative framework for comparing key management strategies and a viability analysis
of alternatives comprise the chapter 4. Finally, chapter 5 summarizes the results obtained
and introduces a wide range of questions that can lead future research in related areas.
Although this document is directed to an audience familiar with cryptography and/or
voting systems, it does not assume any prior knowledge in terms of speciﬁc notation or
concepts. In that regard, the annexes provide a guide about speciﬁc terminology used
in the document. Annex A lists mathematical symbols and variable names, annex B
expands all the acronyms of technologies, techniques and institutions, whereas annex C
contains a short introduction to essential cryptographic primitives.
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2 Overview
The deﬁnition of a cryptographic primitive is typically represented as a network pro-
tocol, where the communication channel is hostile and the parties, conventionally labeled
as Alice and Bob, are trustworthy. In some cases, the idea that the other actors can
deliberately attempt to deviate from the protocol is acknowledged and modeled.
For simplicity in some cases, and for necessity in others, these models rely upon certain
assumptions. Ignoring their existence leads to some of the least evident and most harmful
bugs and vulnerabilities in cryptographic implementations.
There are two major assumptions that support the majority of the functionality in
cryptographic primitives:
1. It is possible to choose an element from an arbitrary set at random with uniform
probability (true randomness).
2. Any actor in a cryptographic protocol is a deterministic black box that can keep a
secret and only discloses the information determined by the protocol.
In particular, the second assumption implies veiled requirements that cannot be met
by any implementation. What is Alice? Is it the user making use of the system, or is
it the computer, or the program running on top? How can Alice be trusted to follow
the protocol? What happens when several copies of secret data (key, password, etc.) are
made? How can a secret key be kept secret?
As a key is a kind of secret that is critical for several cryptographic primitives, these
questions lead to the concept of key management. It consists of following the lifecycle of
a key in order to enable its availability while protecting its secrecy and integrity. The
objective of this section is to describe the importance of key management, the threats
that it must overcome and the existing approaches to the problem.
2.1 Importance of Cryptographic Keys
A cryptographic scheme in the malicious model can oﬀer meaningful guarantees of se-
curity to Alice if Alice is honest. The honesty of Alice is typically described as her
adherence to the protocol. However, modern cryptographic protocols with non-trivial
security parameters cannot be executed correctly and eﬃciently by a human mind. Alice
does not execute the protocol directly, but through a proxy, an information system. In
that scenario, the moral requirement of honesty becomes a technical one.
If Alice is technically honest, she will follow the protocol rigorously up to every con-
straint: correct ordering of the messages will be observed, the variables will be chosen
within the given range, the calculations will be performed accurately and every non-
deterministic action will be as nondeterministic as possible. From the functional point of
view, correctness is enough.
However, from the information security point of view, correctness is not suﬃcient.
Since the main objective of cryptographic protocols is to enforce speciﬁc restrictions
(e.g. only Alice can read the content, the tally can be generated only by the electoral
committee), it is also important for any statement to ensure that no information is leaked
beyond the intended functionality.
In particular, the identity of Alice is usually represented by a secret piece of data:
a key. In cryptographic protocols, the security of the key can determine the security
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boundaries of the system. However, said importance is seldom accounted for within
the design of the protocol. In the context of most cryptographic deﬁnitions, the key is
generated according to certain constraints (e.g. a random element in Zp) and then stored
in a secure void, where it can be accessed when it is required by the protocol.
There is, nevertheless, no secure void within an information system. A key is a string
of bits that needs to be stored and retrieved to working memory and needs to be backed
up to withstand physical failure. A key is a physical entity that can exist in diﬀerent
places at the same time. It is also intended to be the only obstacle for an adversary
attempting an attack within an otherwise secure protocol. In short: a cryptographic
protocol implementation is only as strong as the protection around its key material.
The security of a strong cryptographic protocol is bounded by the weakest path to
any copy of the secret key. The repertoire of attack vectors that aim to recover the secret
key within an encryption system is rich and diverse.
2.2 Attacks Vectors for Key Retrieval
There is active research about how to break keys whose security relies on mathematical
assumptions. For instance, since a private RSA key can be obtained by factoring the
public key, improving factoring can be a way to break the system. However, there are
no eﬃcient algorithms for factoring so far, and therefore RSA is still secure as a scheme
(given the right choice of parameters).
On the other hand, the implementations of cryptographic functions are seldom as
careful and isolated as their mathematical models. Bugs, malpractice and unexpected
variables reduce the diﬃculty of guessing a key. This section describes diﬀerent attack
vectors that leverage this fact.
2.2.1 No Randomness
The diﬀerence between encoding and encryption may be subtle, but essential. An encoded
message can be decoded by anyone who knows (or can derive) the rules. There is no secret
key. An encrypted message, on the other hand, can only be decrypted (theoretically) by
the holder of the key. A similar logic applies for other keyed primitives, such as MAC
integrity checks.
It is a common anti-pattern to hard-code a default constant value within the code of
an application in order to use it as a secret key. If the key used within an encryption
scheme is not random and cannot be changed easily, the encryption scheme is being used
for encoding. If a software product uses it as a key, its retrieval is, at best, as hard as
reverse engineering the application.
2.2.2 Poor Randomness
Any keyed algorithm relies at least once on the random generation of a value k extracted
from the universe of values K with nearly uniform probability. In other words, that(
∀k∗ ∈ K : Pr[k = k∗] ≈ 1|K|
)
.
The deﬁnition of what is random is elusive, although there are tests to assess the
randomness of a string. For this reason, the diﬀerence between randomness that is good
enough for a simulation or the decisions in a game and randomness suitable for crypto-
graphic use is often subtle and not properly analyzed. The use of poor random generators
for cryptographic purposes has been repeatedly documented.
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From the deliberate construction of backdoors [1] to API misuse [2], the usage of
random number generators that are not random enough is a major problem in present
day cryptographic implementations [3].
Furthermore, without access to a true randomness source, a good randomness func-
tion, i.e. a Cryptographically Secure Pseudo Random Number Generator (CSPRNG) a
seed is required: a value that initializes the CSPRNG. The CSPRNG is, after initializ-
ation, deterministic: given a seed, the string of random values produced will always be
the same. Examples of bad seeds are a constant integer or a function of the system time,
and yet the most remarkable mistake regarding seeds is repetition: to use the same seed
in two instances of the CSPRNG. One scenario is the non-random presetting of a key:
choosing an arbitrary but ﬁxed seed defeats its purpose. Another, more subtle alternative
appears when the seed is derived from network, physical and software parameters, since
these parameters do not have enough variance/randomness to act as an acceptable seed.
In both cases, the choice of a weak seed will lead to diﬀerent independent systems
inadvertently sharing keys and the possibility for attackers to calculate it themselves.
2.2.3 Access Control
Access control is, after cryptography, the most eﬃcient family of controls to ensure con-
ﬁdentiality and integrity requirements. It is possible to deﬁne a ﬂexible set of actors,
actions, assets and permissions to model ﬁne grained policies.
Unlike cryptography, access control is not applied directly on the protected asset,
but on its containers: e.g. operating systems, physical facilities, application servers or
network infrastructure. As a result, if access control is overridden, the protected asset is
exposed.
Even under the assumption of a ﬂawless implementation of access control mechanisms,
its conﬁguration is neither static nor trivial. As a result, its maintenance becomes a highly
demanding operational task that is likely to be neglected when it interrupts the execution
of more productive ones. In other words: business continuity is likely to antagonize access
control, deteriorating over time the accuracy with which access control rules reﬂect the
business rules, diminishing its eﬀectiveness as a control.
Another security limitation of access control schemes is that they can fail silently. For
example, a ﬁrewall that is not ﬁltering packages will work as well as one that only accepts
authorized requests as long as only authorized requests are sent.
As a result, relying on access control mechanisms to protect a private key can be
considered a good practice, albeit insuﬃcient. The key can be leaked inadvertently
and the policies might even allow access to another existent but unauthorized user (i.e.
escalation of privileges).
2.2.4 Application Vulnerabilities
Even when a cryptographic algorithm is secure according to a mathematical model, its
implementation requires interaction with existing technologies and their limitations: re-
sponse times, APIs, data types, abstractions, frameworks and legacy applications. As a
result, the vulnerabilities of the underlying technology are inherited by the implement-
ation and need to be addressed or accepted. For example, a cryptographic library in C
needs to acknowledge the possibility of buﬀer overﬂow attacks and prevent information
leakage by exploitation of the same.
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One of the biggest recent examples of the extent to which application dependencies
can lead to major security incidents is the vulnerability CVE-2014-0160, publicly known
as Heartbleed. The vulnerability aﬀected OpenSSL, a major open source library for SSL
support. Under certain conditions, the bug enabled the remote recovery of server side
information, including in some scenarios the secret key of the server. The number of
vulnerable Internet servers varies according to the measurement criteria, but the vulner-
ability existed for years before being revealed and aﬀected a vast amount of the most
visited websites on the Internet [4].
Heartbleed is not the only internet-wide major vulnerability disclosed in the last years,
and the fact that it remained undiscovered for so long reveals how subtle and critical the
security assessment of an application can be.
2.2.5 Poor Protection of Multiple Copies
It is not realistic to assume that there is one single instance of a cryptographic key that
can be used arbitrarily and safely without moving it or copying it. In a real computer,
the key can be stored in secondary storage. When it is needed, a copy is generated in
main memory. Furthermore, the requirements of availability may lead to store backups of
the key in diﬀerent information systems (either cold or hot backup). Finally, for practical
or economical reasons, the same key can be used for diﬀerent solutions that implement a
variety of protocols.
Since each copy of the key is identical, each of them has exactly the same value. For
instance, a digital document can be signed with any of the copies of the key with exactly
the same validity. The main impact of this remark is the fact that the key is only as
secure as the most vulnerable of its containers.
If the key is stored in an encrypted hard drive, but it is not deleted from RAM once
it is used, it may be easier for an attacker to dump the RAM than to decrypt the content
of the disk. Likewise, if the cold backup is stored in a warehouse that is only secured
with a lock, it will be easier for an attacker to steal that copy and leave no digital trace
of the theft.
2.2.6 Malpractice
One of the least obvious consequences of implementing a cryptographic protocol in a
computer is that other processes, unrelated to the protocol itself, can jeopardize the key
to the point of making the whole solution superﬂuous.
The security malpractices that can leak the key are diverse in nature, propensity and
exploitability. Failure to erase the key from a hard drive that is being disposed of enables
a dumpster diver to access the key.
Additional examples of poor security practices include negligent access control con-
ﬁguration (e.g. chmod 777 in Unix systems, used as a way to debug errors related to
system permissions), unsafe transmission of the key material or inadvertent publication
in a public repository.
2.2.7 Side Channel Attacks
The ﬁeld of side channel attacks is the result of the realization that every cryptographic
primitive is executed within a physical machine that may be used for more than a single
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purpose. As a result, it assesses the implications of that observation in terms of the secur-
ity of that primitive. The possibility of retrieving a cryptographic key from the analysis
of the temperature, power consumption or environmental noise deﬁes the validity of the
abstraction in which computer scientists work. When security is involved, a black box
that follows a protocol deliberately omits details that can falsify any security assertion.
Furthermore, the analysis of the eﬀects of concurrency, processing scheduling, latency
and shared memory, among other characteristics of modern computational environments,
provides additional information to adversaries that cannot be fully predicted by math-
ematical models.
The possibility of attacking the underlying system that implements a cryptographic
primitive to break its security is a latent and inherently chaotic threat that needs to be
addressed as part of a cryptographic implementation.
2.3 Key Storage Solutions
The variety and subtlety of attack vectors on a key do not imply that the key is inexorably
exposed and that all keyed cryptographic primitives are insecure. It does imply, however,
that key management is a critical issue and the decisions made around it may impact the
security claims made about the whole system.
This section explores solutions to the problem of key storage and the guarantees that
can be oﬀered by each of them.
2.3.1 Cleartext
A cryptographic key can be represented in a ﬁle. One of the most commonly used
representations for that is the ASN.1 notation. ASN.1 is typically used to encode the
attributes of a cryptographic key in a multiplatform, standardized way. A ﬁle that is
encoded correctly can be copied, transmitted and read like any other ﬁle within the ﬁle
system.
This representation is, however, insuﬃcient for the storage of secret data. A cleartext
key can be leaked or tampered with trivially, and the detection of any compromise is
unlikely, even in the long term. Although the implementation of ﬁle system access control
measures can reduce the attack surface, this representation is still too vulnerable against
experienced attackers.
2.3.2 PKCS#12
The Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) deﬁne the parameters for encoding
cryptographic material used for public key schemes, including certiﬁcates, revocation
lists, certiﬁcate signing requests and private keys. In particular, the standard PKCS#12
deﬁnes the concept of a keystore. The standard is also described in RFC 7292 [5]. A
single keystore may contain diﬀerent entries, identiﬁed by a string knows as alias.
One of the features that diﬀerentiate a keystore as the container of sensitive material
from a normal binary ﬁle is the deﬁnition of several privacy and integrity modes [5]. As
a result, the transmission and storage of personal identity information (i.e. cryptographic
keys and associated information) can be protected with a password derived key or another
key pair.
Although it is theoretically the most powerful option, the use of another key pair
just transfers the problem, since the new key will also need protection. As a result, the
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popular implementations of the protocol (in particular, it is the default mechanism for
the retrieval of a private key from the major Internet browsers and operating systems)
favor the use of password protected keystores.
As a general idea, a password is used in the PKCS#12 standard to derive a symmetric
encryption key. However, the standard oﬀers diﬀerent levels of granularity, which may
or may not use the same password. The ﬁrst separation occurs between privacy and
integrity: the encryption and MAC algorithms might use the same password, or require
two diﬀerent. Furthermore, in addition to global level passwords, it is possible to establish
passwords speciﬁc for each entry in the keystore.
Although the use of key derivation functions reduces the viability of password guessing
attacks, the use of passwords enables usability malpractices that can lead to a leak of
the private key. Some of the pitfalls, enunciated by [6] more than a decade ago and still
present in the industry, lead to the conclusion that no security critical decision should
be left to the discretion of the ﬁnal user, if it can be avoided. Some examples were the
reuse of the same key in diﬀerent environments or sending the password along with the
keystore.
Another speciﬁc scenario involves access to the key material by an automated process.
Be it a server that supports SSL communication, or an application compatible with PGP,
the problem appears when asking the user every time for the password is not feasible or
makes no sense for the speciﬁc process. The storage of the password becomes necessary
but problematic. As a result, the password is stored in locations that are not designed
to store sensitive information, such as a shell script that calls the encryption process, or
an unprotected text ﬁle. In general, a password has the same limitations and privacy
requirements as a cryptographic key, with the additional issue of being human readable,
and could therefore be leaked in unexpected ways. Section 6 of RFC 7292 states just
that limitation and suggests guidelines to maximize the eﬀectiveness of password based
protection.
It must also be noted that the PKCS family focuses on containers and deﬁnitions
for public key encryption material, and thus could be unsuitable for the storage of other
kinds of cryptographic material.
2.3.3 Trusted Platform Modules (TPM)
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a purpose-speciﬁc processor designed to support
cryptographic operations in general purpose computers, standardized by ISO-11889 [7].
Along with security controls against unauthorized use and cryptographic support, its
architecture supports random number generation and key storage.
The TPM is designed to isolate the storage and usage of cryptographic material, as
well as the randomness generation, from the data and instructions, reducing the possibility
of key leakage due to API misuse. Given its increasing presence in consumer products, it
is used to support cryptographic functionality such as BitLocker, the application for Full
Disk Encryption available in recent Windows versions.
The most recent version of TPM, 2.0, enables support for the most common cryp-
tographic algorithms, such as RSA, SHA-1, SHA-256 and elliptic curve. However, no
speciﬁc algorithm is mandatory. In terms of physical portability, a TPM is as portable
as the computing system that contains it.
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2.3.4 Smart Cards
Smart cards are very limited computing devices that rely on a card reader as a power and
communication source. Although they are not designed to enable intensive operations
(neither in terms of time nor space), they often include built-in support of standard cryp-
tographic primitives. As a result, they are a popular, portable and isolated environment
for the storage and usage of cryptographic keys.
The standard ISO/IEC 7816 [8] deﬁnes the features of contact, contactless and hybrid
smart cards, and their cryptographic capabilities are often certiﬁed to some level of the
FIPS 140-2 standard [9]. As a consequence, smart cards are used as a strong authen-
tication mechanism. On the other hand, their functionality is neither scalable nor very
ﬂexible, and their portability enables non-conventional attack vectors, mainly within the
realm of side channel attacks.
A popular development platform for smart cards is Java Card, which is designed
as a subset of the Java language for resource constrained devices. Although it shares its
syntax with Java, Java Card suﬀers from a limited API and extremely limited storage and
processing power. It is designed to support classical cryptographic algorithms, such as
AES, RSA and the SHA hash family. However, it does not oﬀer support for homomorphic
encryption schemes, including ElGamal. An application developed for Java Card is known
as an applet.
2.3.5 Hardware Security Modules (HSM)
A stronger instance of the separation between cryptographic and business operations is
known as a Hardware Security Module (HSM). An HSM is an appliance that imple-
ments tamper-evident and tamper-resistant mechanisms around an application-speciﬁc
cryptographic computer.
HSMs are considered one of the most eﬃcient mechanisms for the secure storage and
usage of cryptographic material, supporting the operation of critical processes such as
online banking, military communications or the operation of a certiﬁcation authority.
They are subject to strict security certiﬁcations, of which FIPS 140-2 [9] is the most
prevalent. The modules include mechanisms that enable high availability, secure key
backup and eﬃcient encryption.
Despite being recognized in the industry as the most powerful option, HSMs are not
cost eﬃcient for every critical process, even when the information being protected is
highly sensitive. Furthermore, very few HSMs enable customized functionality, and the
ones that do are even more expensive. As a result, the search for cheaper ways to obtain
similar levels of assurance and greater levels of customization becomes an important
research ﬁeld.
2.4 Secret Sharing and Threshold Encryption
The approach for key protection described up to this point is to treat a key as a single
point of failure. If there are several copies of the key, each of them is critical, since the
leak of any of them compromises the security of the system as a whole, regardless of the
controls implemented around the other copies. In this section, the aim is to distribute
the risk so that, if the controls around one copy are compromised, the security of the
system remains resilient.
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The most popular approach in this direction is Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme [10],
remarkable as a cryptographic scheme that is both practical and information-theoretically
secure. In this approach, the key is split into shares that can be used to reconstruct the
key later on.
This approach introduces two concepts: secret sharing and threshold.
A secret sharing scheme involves two phases: the generation of the shares and the
reconstruction phase. For the generation of the shares, two parameters are deﬁned: the
number of shares n and the threshold t. The shares are generated from a secret s and
distributed among diﬀerent trustees. The reconstruction phase allows the calculation of
s if and only if at least t shares are available. After the reconstruction phase, the secret
is no longer shared.
The selection of the values t and n depends on each speciﬁc scenario, strongly de-
termined by its practical constraints. How many trustees will receive a share? Should
one trustee receive more shares than another? Which is the minimum amount of trustees
required to perform the threshold reconstruction? It is essential to note that diﬀerent
choices for these values will result in diﬀerent implications.
A high threshold will reduce liability in the case where few shares are compromised or
a group of the trustees collude. If more shares are required (i.e. if t is bigger), a collusion
or an attack will need to compromise a wider attack surface. On the other hand, if the
threshold is too close to the total number of shares, the integrity and availability of the
key is jeopardized. In the extreme case, if n = t, it would suﬃce to lose or corrupt one
share to make the system unusable.
Threshold schemes, thus, oﬀer resilience or security, but for most reasonable values,
these features constitute a trade-oﬀ.
2.4.1 Shamir's Secret Sharing
As mentioned earlier, Shamir's Secret Sharing scheme is one of the ﬁrst and most popular
secret sharing schemes [10]. Given a secret value s ∈ Zp, it produces a set S = {S1, ..., Sn}
as follows:
Algorithm 1: Shamir.SecretSharing
input : s, t, n
output: a, S
1 a0 ← s;
2 for i← 1 to t− 1 do
3 ai
$←− Zp ; // Create [t] random coefficients
4 for i← 1 to n do
5 xi ← getX(i) ; // Creates a value of [x] for the [i]-th share
// Polynomial evaluation:
6 yi ← a0;
7 for j ← 1 to t− 1 do
8 yi ← si + aj · xji
9 si ← (xi, yi)
10 a← a0, ..., at−1;
11 S ← s1, ..., sn
The only requirement for the function getX(i) is to produce diﬀerent values in Zp for
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diﬀerent inputs of i. In particular, deﬁning getX(i) = i is acceptable. As a result, the
indexes can be public.
A set S ′ = {S ′1, ..., S ′t} such that S ′ ⊆ S can be used to reconstruct the secret s using
Lagrange interpolation as follows:
Shamir.SecretReconstruction(S ′ = (X ′, Y ′)) = s = L(0) =
k∑
j=0
Y ′j
k∏
m=0,m 6=j
X ′m
X ′m −X ′j
(1)
2.4.2 Veriﬁable Secret Sharing
In the basic Shamir's secret sharing scheme, the trust in the dealer is absolute: the
trusted parties receive values in Zp that are indiscernible from random. The deﬁnition of
the scheme ensures that a group of at least k parties will be able to produce a secret s∗,
but there is no way to prove to the shareholders that s = s∗.
This is particularly critical when the secret is to be used as the private key of an
encryption scheme. If the dealer creates a key pair (sk, pk), publishes pk and then
distributes n random values in Zp instead of correctly calculated shares, all the messages
encrypted using pk will be lost, since (with overwhelming probability) those shares will
not produce the value sk. In the case of a voting process, the error could only be detected
after the election is over and all the votes would be lost.
The approach to reduce the impact of this observation is known as Veriﬁable Secret
Sharing (VSS)[11]. The aim of VSS is to ensure consistency by verifying that the shares
are not randomly chosen values. In the case of the key pair, the objective is to prove that
an arbitrary share si is a valid share for the secret key sk. In particular, this validation
should be possible without requiring access to the other shares, disclosure the value sk
nor initiation of the reconstruction process.
The models for VSS vary depending upon the nature of the secret. For instance, in
the case of a key pair (sk, pk), the relationship between the secret sk and the public value
pk can be used to prove properties of sk without revealing its value. The scope of VSS
is deﬁned in [12] in two points:
1. Prevent a malicious dealer from distributing incorrect shares to the participants
(i.e. send s∗ 6∈ S, where S =SecretSharing(s) for an arbitrary secret s).
2. Prevent a malicious trusted party from contributing with an incorrect share to
SecretReconstruction (i.e. for a user i, to send s∗ 6= si).
2.4.3 Distributed Key Generation
VSS is an important building block in threshold cryptography, but its functional purpose
is unclear until it is looked at in the context of Distributed Key Generation (DKG).
The goal of DKG is to securely distribute shares of a secret key among authorized users.
The exact extent of the term securely depends on the diﬀerent scenarios considered.
Speciﬁcally, the security model depends on the existence or absence of a trusted dealer.
If there is a trusted dealer, its function is to create the secret value and distribute
its shares using a VSS scheme. If there is no trusted dealer, each of the trusted parties
contributes to the calculation of a shared secret. An example of a DKG protocol without
a trusted dealer is discussed in section 4.4.2.
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2.5 Cryptography and E-Voting
This section shifts the perspective from key management to the other end of the problem
of this thesis: online voting. The description of voting as an information security problem
shares so many elements with the description of a Multi-Party Computation (MPC)
protocol that both research areas are intricately entangled and the results of one often
are a generalization (or an instance) of the other.
A voting process involves a simple objective, the aggregation of the points of view
of a group of valid voters into a measurable result (the tally). Given a set of previously
deﬁned rules, the functional side of the solution is not likely to pose a hard engineering
challenge. The security of the process, however, is complicated by a diverse set of actors
who, guided by a wide range of motivations, may collude to inﬂuence the value of the
tally.
Each of the entities involved in a voting process has the right or the duty of fulﬁlling
a particular role in the process. For example, the voters may cast a vote, the registration
authority must issue identities and the tallying authority has to aggregate the values of
the votes cast. However, each of the parties might be willing to exceed their inﬂuence in
the process, and therefore each of them has reason to mistrust the others.
When the dynamics of the process lead to requirements that seem to be contradictory
(such as ballot secrecy and veriﬁability), the attempts to satisfy them call for the use of
specialized cryptographic approaches. The techniques, thoroughly documented in [13],
include homomorphic encryption, mix-nets, blind signatures, Zero Knowledge Proofs and
commitments.
2.5.1 Availability of Technology
It is important to remark that while there is broad support of cryptographic functionality,
both in the form of APIs and end user products, said support is focused on the protection
of the world driven by content and multimedia that represents the majority of all Internet
traﬃc.
A survey on encryption products was published in February 2016 by a team led by
the researcher Bruce Schneier [14]. Although the researchers themselves acknowledge
that the content might be incomplete or inaccurate (the research relied on crowdsourcing
as one of the sources for the data), the survey aims to reﬂect the main trends in terms
of cryptography implementations. The survey identiﬁes 865 solutions that range from
incipient projects to mature corporate solutions, enabling encryption in diﬀerent categor-
ies, including ﬁle encryption, secure ﬁle transfer, email and IM encryption, cryptographic
libraries, secure calling and decentralized Internet tools (anonymizers, cryptocurrencies,
onion browsing, proxies, etc.). None of them involves explicitly Multi-Party Computa-
tion or Zero Knowledge Proofs 1. There are two open source C++ projects that claim
to support homomorphic operations. One of them is labeled by its authors as mostly
meant for researchers[15].
In particular, there are no broadly accepted and tested implementations. While mod-
ern programming languages have native API to support cryptographic operations (e.g.
Java Cryptography Architecture) and libraries like BouncyCastle [16] and OpenSSL [17]
are widely used, tested and maintained, implementations related to MPC functionality
1Three of the products use the term zero knowledge while describing what is commonly known as
end-to-end encryption. There is no reference to Zero Knowledge Proofs associated with them.
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are scarce and mostly proofs of concept, which means that they are not designed to be
used securely in production environments.
There are implementations of MPC across the world, but the fact that they are not
identiﬁed under the spotlight of such a broad survey suggests that the knowledge is very
centralized and inaccessible.
17
3 Key Management in the Estonian Internet Voting
Process
The objective of this document is to present a key management scheme suitable for
electronic voting. As a study case, it examines the case of Estonian Internet Voting,
which has been used as a valid channel for casting legally binding votes since 2005 [18].
3.1 Internet Voting in Estonia
Since its introduction in 2005 the adoption of online voting in Estonia has been slow,
but is steadily increasing. During the European Parliament Elections of 2014 and the
National Parliamentary Elections of 2015, more than 30% of the votes were cast via this
channel.
The main characteristic of the Estonian model is that elections are held over the In-
ternet, as opposed to an event held within controlled venues2. That design choice implies
the need of a carefully deﬁned security model, comprising both strong mathematical tools
and security procedures. In fact, given that the reliability of the model depends on the
right selection and interaction of complex tools, as opposed to simple concepts such as
ballot recounting, there have been evaluators who are not satisﬁed with the Estonian
model [19].
One of the measures that can be taken to address the criticisms is to ensure that the
technical implementation is as faithful to the proven security models as possible. Within
this approach, the protection of the secret key material becomes a critical aspect.
3.1.1 Current Status of Internet Voting
The Estonian identiﬁcation card gives every citizen two certiﬁed key pairs for authentic-
ation and document signature. This mechanism enables the creation of a secure channel
with bidirectional strong authentication between organizations and individuals, in or-
der to enable security controls for important services such as online banking or Internet
voting.
The existing implementation of Internet voting in Estonia uses pure public key en-
cryption and digital signatures in a double envelope scheme. Since 2013, a mechanism
for out of band cast-as-intended and recorded-as-cast vote veriﬁcation has been imple-
mented on top of the existing system, introducing a mobile application for veriﬁcation,
independent of the core voting system by design Heiberg and Willemson [18].
The vote is protected by a scheme known as double envelope. The scheme deﬁnes two
independent layers of encapsulation for the vote. For the Estonian implementation, the
inner layer is the the value of the vote encrypted with RSA-OAEP using the public key
of the voting authority. The outer layer is the signature of the encrypted message, using
the signature key of the identiﬁcation card of the voter. The two layers are processed
sequentially by diﬀerent components of the system. Once all the votes are cast, one server
veriﬁes the signature of the votes, removes it from the message and sends the votes, now
merely encrypted, to the device in charge of the decryption of the messages. Currently,
the decryption device is a Safenet Luna SA HSM.
2The possibility of paper voting at a precinct is also available in Estonia, but is considered as an
entirely diﬀerent voting channel.
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3.1.2 Need for Stronger Controls
The Estonian Internet Voting system is simple by design. It can be explained to non-
technical voters by analogy to voting by physical mail and there are no black box proced-
ures that would generate suspicion. Although it requires a strong technical background,
the implementation details, including the source code, are publicly available for audit.
However, there are still attack vectors that can be exploited.
One remarkable example is the removal of the two envelopes. In principle, there
are two servers srv1, srv2. srv1 receives a batch of votes, each of them of the form
Sigvoter(Encauthority(vote)). It veriﬁes and stripes the signature from the votes. After-
wards, it sends to srv2 the encrypted votes as a set of elements of the form Encauthority(vote).
If only srv2 has the secret key skauthority, srv1 can only verify the signatures without
learning the value of vote. If srv2 receives only encrypted votes without a signature, it
cannot track a speciﬁc vote back to a voter.
However, if there is a channel between srv1 and srv2, the cooperation between the
two servers can break the secrecy of the ballot. A mix network can be implemented to
mediate the communication between srv1 and srv2 while hindering this attack vector.
In a broader sense, a voting scheme needs to employ non-conventional cryptographic
techniques to defend against certain attack vectors that cannot be ruled out within a
voting scenario. This document focuses on the impact of that fact in the problem of key
management.
3.2 Current Approach to Key Management
The current infrastructure of the Estonian Internet Voting system relies on an HSM
for decryption, in the role of srv2. Before the election, the election oﬃcials are given
hardware tokens. After all the votes are cast, the oﬃcials connect the tokens to the
HSM and, employing a threshold secret sharing scheme, the votes are decrypted using
traditional RSA-OAEP. The secret key is only used during the tallying phase of the
process, but the secrecy of the ballot (speciﬁcally, the link between the identity of a voter
and their vote) must be guaranteed for a long term.
The functionality of the HSM is very well deﬁned, and subject to rigorous certiﬁcation
processes [20, 21]. However, the security guarantees for the key come at the cost of
ﬂexibility. As a result, the functionality that can be implemented is very restricted.
On the other hand, for several security critical processes the cost of acquisition and
maintenance of an HSM can be hard to justify. Even more so when the process produces
no income to cover its operational costs.
The search of more cost eﬀective alternatives to protect cryptographic keys for online
voting schemes is the main motivation for the present work.
3.3 Scale in Estonian Internet Voting
The size of a nation-wide election is an important factor, even though Estonian popu-
lation is relatively small. In particular, the number of candidates and voters may vary
signiﬁcantly between elections. Local elections often feature more candidates, whereas at
a country level the amount of voters is the predominant value.
8 elections have been held in Estonia supporting Internet Voting as a voting channel.
The last 5 have registered at least 100.000 Internet votes each. The elections for European
Parliament in 2015 in Estonia listed 88 candidates. There were almost 900.000 eligible
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voters, of which nearly 177.000 cast their votes online [22]. During the local elections of
2013, for the Tartu City Council election alone the number of candidates went up as high
as 437 [23].
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4 Solution Design
The scenario of online voting introduces a series of trade-oﬀs. Between security and en-
franchisement, between diﬀerent security requirements, between security and eﬃciency,
and so on. Since security is often one of the most critical and ubiquitous requirements in
dispute, this section aims to deﬁne parameters to enable a comparison between key man-
agement strategies. After deﬁning these parameters, three solutions for key management
in online voting scenarios are proposed.
As described in section 3.1.1, the Estonian Internet Voting system relies on a double
envelope model, where the innermost envelope, which contains the encrypted-only vote,
is decrypted by an HSM. The following table presents the main security features of the
current HSM-based approach to key management in the Estonian Internet Voting System,
as well as additional features that can strengthen the security oﬀered by the system:
Parameter Description
HSM functionality3
Asymmetric algorithms Batch decryption of votes, currently using
RSA. Support for standard ElGamal
Random Number Generation FIPS 140-2 approved DRBG (SP 800-90
CTR mode)
Level of tamper controls Tamper evident, tamper resistant
Security certiﬁcations FIPS 140-2 Level 3 [20], Common Criteria
EAL 4 (augmented) [21]
MTBF4 66561 hours
Access control Threshold USB tokens
Scalability The scheme is able to support a nation-wide
voting process for the Estonian system, ac-
counting for its consistently growing adop-
tion (see section 3.3)
Desired additional functionality
Homomorphic encryption support Additive homomorphic encryption protocols
relying on standard security assumptions
(e.g. Lifted ElGamal, Paillier, Damgård-
Jurik)
Zero Knowledge Proofs Sigma protocols
4.1 Key Management Quality Assessment
The conﬁdentiality of a cryptographic key is harder to formalize than the conﬁdentiality
of raw data because it is at the end of the chain of assumptions. An encryption algorithm,
for instance, is secure under a particular deﬁnition if a set of conditions hold. One of
3According to the oﬃcial functionality described in [24]
4Mean Time Between Failures. Standard availability measure
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them is the conﬁdentiality of the key. If the key was treated as raw data and encrypted,
then there would be another key that would need protection itself, just propagating the
problem.
As a result, the comparison between key management strategies requires the deﬁni-
tion of its potentially relevant properties. There are good practices deﬁned for certain
scenarios, but there is no mature framework to compare diﬀerent features. This section
will propose a deﬁnition of such a framework, at least within the scope of cryptographic
protocols for online voting.
4.1.1 Trusted Computing Base
In information security the term Trusted Computing Base (TCB) refers to a set of com-
ponents of a system that need to be assumed as ﬂawless, both in terms of functionality
and security, in order to be able to build a security model on top of it. It is inherent to the
problem: if not even the basic operations of a processor can be trusted, it is impossible
to verify that the system implemented actually behaves as it was designed.
For the purpose of this document, the hardware designed speciﬁcally for cryptographic
functionality (i.e. TPMs, HSMs, smart cards) will be assumed to be within the scope
of the TCB. The operations supported by these devices are assumed to work exactly as
described and the storage space can only be accessed by an authorized party.
The scope within which the trustworthiness of said devices can actually be held de-
pends on the speciﬁc device, and can only be supported by means of a thorough eval-
uation. For example, the standard FIPS 140-2 deﬁnes requirements for cryptographic
modules with extensive coverage of tamper protections: evidence, resistance and reac-
tion. There is an extensive oﬀer of cryptographic devices certiﬁed at some level deﬁned
by FIPS 140-2.
In particular, the implementation of cryptographic functionality within said crypto-
graphic hardware is expected to be designed to resist against known side channel attacks.
4.1.2 Lifecycle of the Key
The attack surface around the key is determined by its lifecycle. By characterizing
the generation, transmission, storage, usage and destruction of the key, it is possible
to describe more accurately the ways in which the key can be retrieved, and therefore
identify how it could be exploited by an adversary. The following criteria are proposed
to deﬁne the lifecycle of a cryptographic key:
Phase Feature Description Attribute
Key generation Random number
generation
The key is generated us-
ing as a parameter the ran-
domness generated by a
CSPRNG or a true random
number generator.
Conﬁdentiality
Key generation Veriﬁable
correctness
of generator
The key is generated ac-
cording to the parameters of
the algorithm and the cor-
rect generation can be at-
tested.
Conﬁdentiality
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Transport Encrypted
transport
Any communication of sens-
itive material (i.e. key
or randomness) beyond the
boundaries of the TCB.
Conﬁdentiality,
Integrity
Usage Access control It is possible to deﬁne
roles and authorized actions
around the key. The rules
can be provably enforced.
Conﬁdentiality
Usage The key cannot
be used by an
unauthorized
actor or group
No operation (e.g. encryp-
tion, decryption) can use
the key if it is triggered
by an unauthorized actor or
group.
Conﬁdentiality
Storage Tampering pro-
tection
The key cannot be modiﬁed
(i.e. replaced by another
key or destroyed) by an un-
authorized actor or group.
Integrity
Storage Resilience The key can be used
after the failure or non-
availability of parts of the
TCB.
Integrity
Key destruction The key can
be destroyed
irreversibly
It must not be possible to
use or retrieve any copy of
the key.
Conﬁdentiality
The main idea of these criteria is to remark that obtaining the key is not the only
way to break its security. Any aspect of the scheme that leads to calculate the key, non-
negligibly reduce the key space or produce a valid encryption is equally critical to the
security of the system and needs to be prevented.
Within the scope of this document, this framework is qualitative. The security of the
key management strategy can be described in terms of the parameters presented, but no
quantitative measure of security is produced from it.
4.2 Design Option 1: Replacing the HSM with Smart Cards
Summary: While the process remains unchanged, the decryption of the votes is supported
by smart cards instead of an HSM. A threshold decryption scheme would enhance the
decentralization of the model.
Smart card model: Feitian JavaCOS A22
Technology: Java Card 2.2.2
Description: there is a breach between the models for usage and security of an HSM and
the ones of a smart card. HSMs are mechanisms designed to be a centralized system
that can be accessed by diﬀerent users with diﬀerent clearance levels. As a result, they
support strong access control techniques, such as threshold secret sharing. On the other
hand, smart cards are intended for personal usage and possession is already assumed to
be a proof of authorization. In some cases additional controls such as PIN codes are in
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place, but they do not support any kind threshold schemes natively. Threshold schemes
are paramount to certify that no single individual has too much power within an election.
In particular, there are threshold decryption schemes (based on VSS with untrusted
dealer) for public key encryption systems such as RSA[25], ElGamal[26] and Paillier[27].
One of the simplest schemes involves ElGamal.
As it has been stated previously, cryptographic hardware is very limited with regard to
the algorithms supported, and traditional ElGamal is not supported. However, ElGamal
relies heavily on the same operation as RSA: ab mod c.
This fact enabled objective of building a prototype for that functionality, but hindered
its performance. It was possible to implement support for ElGamal as a Java Card Applet,
but the performance of this software-based implementation was very low. The time was
very stable, but very high. Each exponentiation would require between 615 and 625
ms. A single card performed on average 500 operations in 309 seconds. Given its stable
behavior, it is estimated that it can perform nearly 5800 operations within an hour.
In other words, just for the most basic implementation of ElGamal, without enabling
any threshold feature, considering the transmission time of the ciphertext, analyzing vul-
nerability against timing or other side channel attacks, and assuming a very conservative
voter turnover rate, 20 cards running in parallel for one hour would be required to decrypt
the votes for a single country-wide Estonian election.
Even for the execution of built-in operations, smart cards (and Java Cards in partic-
ular) are too slow to support the decryption of a big number of ciphertexts.
Result: It is not scalable enough to fulﬁll the requirements of a nation-wide election.
4.3 Design option 2: Smart Cards with Homomorphic Tallying
Summary: Preprocess the ciphertexts in a more powerful system using homomorphic
tallying techniques. Use smart cards to decrypt only the tally.
Smart card model: Feitian JavaCOS A22
Technology: Java Card 2.2.2, preprocessing server
Description: The main obstacle identiﬁed during the design of a solution involving smart
cards is the amount of decryption operations that are required. Homomorphic encryption
schemes enable certain operations (addition, for instance) on ciphertexts without decryp-
tion, and, speciﬁcally, homomorphic tallying is a common example of how homomorphic
addition can be leveraged to produce more complex functionality.
In an additively homomorphic encryption system, there exists an operation ⊗ such
that E(m1)⊗E(m2) = E(m1⊕m2). The addition can be performed repeatedly to obtain
the sum of a set of encrypted values: given a setm of size n, ⊗1≤i≤nE(mi) = E(⊕1≤i≤nmi).
The operation of tallying is not far from the addition of a set. Given a list of can-
didates l = {1..L}, a list of votes will be represented by a set v s.t. vi ∈ l. The
outcome of the voting process, T = tally(v) = {T1, ..., TL} is a vector of size L s.t.
Ti = |{j|1 ≤ j ≤ |v| : vj = li}|. In plain words, the tally is a vector with the count of the
amount of votes for each candidate.
Given an arbitrary vote vi and a partial tally T
′ = {T ′1, ..., T ′L}, the eﬀect of counting
vi into T
′ is to increase the value of T ′vi by 1. However, ballot secrecy demands that the
value of vi remains secret. In other words, the vote must be correctly counted without
disclosing how it was counted.
Homomorphic tallying, ﬁrst proposed by [28], consists of leveraging the homomorphic
properties of an encryption system to enable tallying without compromising ballot secrecy.
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A popular approach for achieving this objective is to encode the tally as a single integer
and deﬁne the vote to modify only a speciﬁc portion of that integer. As an example, let
L = 3 and the maximum amount of votes for a candidate be M = 11112 = 15. The tally
will be a 4 · 3 = 12-bit long integer initialized in 0:
T= 0000 0000 0000
A vote v will be a bit string as long as T with only one bit on, corresponding to the
LSB of the region of the tally that represents a speciﬁc candidate. For instance, a vote
for the candidate 2 will be encoded as:
v = 0000 0001 0000 =16
The addition of both bit arrays will increase the tally by 1:
T= 0000 0000 0000
v = 0000 0001 0000
T + v = 0000 0001 0000
The encoding of the vote can be done eﬃciently, thus reducing the tallying problem
to the homomorphic addition problem, under the assumption of an honest voter. For
most realistic voting scenarios, however, that assumption does not hold. As a result, a
zero knowledge proof of validity must be calculated for every vote.
As can be seen in the example, there are two variables that determine the size of
the tally representation: the amount of candidates (L) and the maximum amount of
votes (M) that can be cast. In order to prevent integer overﬂow incidents which would
jeopardize the reliability of the election, the size of T in bits must be:
|T | = L ∗ log2M (2)
These are the bit lengths for diﬀerent values of L and M .
M
PPPPPPPPPlog2M
L
2 10 16 128 1024
4 2 4 20 32 256 2048
64 6 12 60 96 768 6144
1024 10 20 100 160 1280 10240
16384 14 28 140 224 1792 14336
262144 18 36 180 288 2304 18432
4194304 22 44 220 352 2816 22528
67108864 26 52 260 416 3328 26624
Considering a reasonable growth margin on top of the numbers in section 3.3, for
the Estonian scenario M = 218 voters and L = 210 = 1024 are sensible dimensions. To
support those magnitudes, each vote would need to be encoded as a 18432-bit integer.
The performance overhead induced by this encoding cannot be disregarded, but could
be accepted if the operations were performed in plaintext in a powerful device. However,
the scheme as a whole is not scalable for several reasons:
1. Homomorphic addition is possible, but not eﬃcient.
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2. Common alternatives of homomorphic encryption with high values, such as the
Paillier cryptosystem, need to perform operations modulo ns where n is the max-
imum size of the plaintext and s ≥ 2 (note that the s within the exponent is an
arbitrary constant, not to be associated with a secret value). Arithmetic operations
modulo a 184322 =339738624-bits long number are not supported by any readily
available cryptographic hardware, and are slow in software.
3. The kind of zero knowledge proofs required to attest the validity of the vote en-
coding, known as range ZKP, are possible [29], but ineﬃcient within a smart card
environment. In particular, they become the kind of bulk operation that needs to
be avoided for a smart card based system.
Result: the scalability of the scheme is severely limited by the number of candidates
L and, to a lesser extent, by the maximum number of votes, specially when veriﬁability
and smart cards are involved.
Disclaimer: during the later stages of this project we learned about an alternative
approach to homomorphic tallying named vector tallying. Although it still demands
heavily computation-intensive correctness proofs, it is intended to be more eﬃcient than
the basic homomorphic tallying approach and might be reﬁned into a feasible solution for
this problem in the future. The idea is presented in [30] and a recent publication suggests
a performance improvement by generating zero knowledge proofs of correct mixing of a
predeﬁned vector, as opposed to proofs of correct encryption [31].
4.4 Design Option 3: Veriﬁable Secret Sharing in Smart Cards
Summary: the private key is generated in a veriﬁable distributed manner. It is only
reconstructed at the time of decryption.
Smart card model: Feitian JavaCOS A22
Technology: Java Card 2.2.2, preprocessing server
Description: the options 1 and 2 suggest that threshold decryption cannot be performed
eﬃciently for the input sizes of the Estonian Internet Voting scenario. A possible result
is to reduce the security demands of the smart cards within the general scenario: to
implement only a Distributed Key Generation approach.
This scheme considers the possibility of weakening the security deﬁnition of the system
in order to enable its implementation. Speciﬁcally, the secret key is built in a distributed
manner, but it needs to be calculated in a centralized manner in order to perform the
decryption. At that point, the key is stored in a new trusted container, and its security
is limited by the security of the container. This container, in practical terms, could be
the computer that reads the smart cards.
A prototype for this functionality was built on the grounds of two previous works that
enable two diﬀerent aspects of DKG: the ﬁrst one enables an eﬃcient implementation in
Java Card with a trusted dealer and the latter discusses how to remove the trusted dealer.
4.4.1 DKG in Java Card: the CRISES' Report
A report published in 2013 by a Spanish research group known as CRISES [32], describes
the implementation of a threshold variant of ElGamal designed in order to implement
all sensitive operations securely into the JavaCard. The result requires the existence
of a trusted dealer, which is chosen at random amongst the smart cards, but addresses
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both at a theoretical and at a practical level some of the most recurrent and demanding
challenges of implementing threshold cryptography on smart cards.
One of the main elements missing in the Java Card API in order to implement cus-
tom cryptographic algorithms is an equivalent to the Java class BigInteger, which
enables support for arbitrary length integers and eﬃcient modular operations. This
class is used extensively in Java cryptographic implementations such as BouncyCastle
[16]. As an essential building block, the CRISES group built a Java Card class called
MutableBigInteger (inspired by a homonymic class in the Java API), which implements
most of the arithmetic operations. The support for modular operations is enabled by
leveraging the support for RSA operations oﬀered by Java Card.
On top of that implementation, the group introduced the functionality required for
their protocol: ElGamal key generation, commitments, secret sharing and ElGamal en-
cryption/decryption. The group published the code of their prototype on GitHub [33].
Protocol overview
The DKG is documented in detail in the chapter 3 of their report and involves seven
tasks (the VSS task is divided as each part of it needs to produce commitments). The fol-
lowing description remains informal as a diﬀerent version of the protocol will be proposed
at the end of this chapter:
1. Election and certiﬁcation of the electoral board: deﬁnes the trustees that
will form the voting authority (i.e. the n shareholders) and the initialization of the
smart cards.
2. Creation of the electoral board: the information about the other parties is
shared. Particularly, the threshold conﬁguration and the digital certiﬁcates of the
other smart cards are stored in each of the cards.
3. ElGamal key generation: all the cards get the public ElGamal parameters. One
card is selected randomly as the dealer. The dealer generates an ElGamal key pair
(sk, pk).
4. Veriﬁable Secret Sharing: The dealer generates the shares of the secret value,
distributes the shares and destroys the value sk.
(a) Phase 1 - Coeﬃcients: generates the coeﬃcients of the Shamir polynomial.
Commits to them.
(b) Phase 2 - Values of x: builds the polynomial and deﬁnes the output of the
function getX(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Commits to the values produced.
(c) Phase 3 - Shares: evaluates the polynomial, producing S. Securely elimin-
ates sk. Commits to the shares.
5. Share distribution: creates secret authenticated channels between the card of the
dealer and each of the other cards using their digital certiﬁcates. Sends one share
to each of the smart cards. Securely eliminates the shares that were transmitted.
6. Share veriﬁcation: each smart card decrypts its share and veriﬁes the commit-
ments associated.
7. Share signing: each smart card signs a commitment to its share and makes the
commitment public.
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The expectation of secure deletion of the secret and the shares is the single point of
failure that is not acceptable for this scenario. Since there is no way to prove that the
deletion occurred, it is possible for the dealer smart card to keep the secret inadvertently,
either accidentally (e.g. the card is removed before the deletion is invoked) or intentionally
(e.g. the code is tampered to not remove the secret).
Eﬃciency results
The CRISES' report includes a benchmark of their protocol, covering the operations
performed on the smart card. Individually, the operations are slow but considered ac-
ceptable: the share generation and distribution is performed within minutes, whereas the
decryption is performed in a matter of seconds.
This result is consistent with the one of the design option 1 presented in section 4.2,
in the sense that decryption is not scalable to the level of a batch operation. The report,
accordingly, remarks that this system needs to be used in the context of homomorphic
or hybrid voting systems, but is not realistic in the scenario of mixnet based e-voting
protocols.
4.4.2 Untrusted Dealer
An approach to remove the need of the trusted dealer is presented in [34]. It is based
on the ElGamal cryptosystem [35] and a VSS variant of Shamir's Secret Sharing. Once
the share generation is ﬁnished, the encryption, reconstruction and decryption phases are
essentially unchanged.
The key distribution process requires that each authorized party executes the protocol,
and uses the data published by the other parties in order to complete it. The protocol
deﬁnition here is adapted to reﬂect its execution in a concurrent, potentially distributed
environment. Let A be the list of authorized shareholders and Ai denote a unique iden-
tiﬁer of the i-th shareholder. The function broadcast(m) shares a message m with all
the other parties, whereas send(i,m) shares the message m via a secret authenticated
channel with the shareholder Ai.
The deﬁnition takes the parameters p, q, g from the underlying ElGamal scheme and
the threshold values t, n. The ﬁrst step in the process is the key generation:
Algorithm 2: PedersenDKG.LocalKeyGeneration
input : p, q, g
output : xi, hi
executed by: every Ai ∈ A
1 xi
$←− Zq;
2 hi ← gxi ;
3 r ← R ; // Set R not specified in the source
4 Ci ←Commitment.Commit(hi, ri);
5 broadcast(Ci)
The key pair generated by Ai must not be inﬂuenced by any other value hj(i 6= j). To
ensure that property, each shareholder commits to its own hi before getting access to hj.
Once each shareholder has generated its commitment, the commitments are open and a
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shared public key is calculated:
Algorithm 3: PedersenDKG.SharedPublicKeyGeneration
input : hi, C
output : h
executed by: every Ai ∈ A
1 broadcast(hi, ri);
2 for Aj ∈ A \ Ai do
3 wait(hj, rj) ; // Wait for the other parties to publish their public
key values
4 if Commitment.Open(hj, Cj, rj)=0 then
5 stopAndReport(hj, Cj, rj)
6 h←∏nj=1 hj;
Since all the public shares hi were broadcast, each actor in A obtains the same public
key, which is to be made public also for the voters. The rest of the key generation protocol
is focused on the cooperation necessary to calculate shares for the value of x =
∑n
i=1 xi
such that h = gx while preserving the (t, n)−threshold properties.
For the next step, each authorized party must execute an independent instance of
Shamir.SecretSharing. The resulting coeﬃcients and shares will be identiﬁed by two
indexes: aj,i will describe the j-th coeﬃcient of Ai (with the wildcard a∗,i to identify the
whole set of coeﬃcients of Ai). Likewise, sj,i will describe the j-th share of si. Each
authorized party continues its procedure by generating shares of their values xi:
Algorithm 4: PedersenDKG.SharedSecretKeyGenerationInit
input : xi, g, t, n
output : sj,∗ (the shares received from the other parties)
executed by: every Ai ∈ A
1 a∗,i, Si ←Shamir.SecretSharing(xi, t, n);
2 for j ← 1 to t− 1 do
3 Fi,j ← gaj,i ;
4 broadcast(Fi,j);
5 for j ← 1 to n do
6 send(j,sj,i) ; // Note that for the step i=j, the share is send to
itself.
The ﬁrst cycle commits to the coeﬃcients of the secret sharing polynomial. The
second cycle sends a share of the secret xi to each member of A. In other words, Ai has
a share of each of the secrets created for the protocol. If t members of A agree, they
can reconstruct all of the secrets xi. The last part of the protocol adds the last layer of
veriﬁability and aggregates the shares in order to require one single secret reconstruction
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process:
Algorithm 5: PedersenDKG.SharedSecretKeyGenerationFinish
input : g, n, si,∗, F, h
output : si. Additionally signs the computed private key h if the key shares
are consistent.
executed by: every Ai ∈ A
1 for j ← 1 to n do
2 if !verify(gsi,j =
∏t−1
l=0 F
il
j,l) ; // Verify share consistency
3 then
4 reportFailureAndStop();
5 si ←
∑n
j=1 sj,i;
6 publish(SigAi(h))
As originally intended, the result of the process is an ElGamal key pair for which
the secret key is (t, n)−shared. The reconstruction process of the key is the default
Shamir.SecretReconstruction scheme, and the encryption and decryption processes
are the standard ElGamal algorithms.
The PedersenDKG algorithm can be summarized as follows:
Algorithm 6: PedersenDKG
input : p, q, g, t, n
output : s. Additionally signs the computed private key h if the key shares
are consistent.
executed by: every Ai ∈ A
1 xi, hi ←PerdersenDKG.LocalKeyGeneration(p, q, g);
2 h← PerdersenDKG.SharedPublicKeyGeneration(hi);
3 si,∗, F ←PerdersenDKG.SharedSecretKeyGenerationInit(xi, g, t, n);
4 s←PerdersenDKG.SharedSecretKeyGenerationFinish(g, n, si,∗, F, h)
Another useful visualization of the algorithm focuses on the use of commitments as
synchronization points, as the algorithm requires that the commitments of the other
parties are generated (and subsequently correctly open) before continuing its ﬂow:
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A1 ... An
C1 Cn Each node creates an independent key pair
Open C∗ commitments
F1,∗ Fn,∗ Each node created a set of t coeﬃcients
Open F∗,∗ commitments
It is important to remark that the deﬁnition of PedersenDKG.LocalKeyGeneration
uses a generic deﬁnition of commitment, whereas the coeﬃcient commitments are expli-
citly deﬁned as part of the protocol.
4.4.3 Architecture
Although the notation, the entities and the terminology of the CRISES report and the
Pedersen's DKG scheme diﬀer vastly, it was possible to modify the CRISES source code
to remove the trusted dealer.
A review of the CRISES protocol revealed that the main diﬀerence between their
implementation and the scheme proposed by Pedersen was the number of users performing
the key generation process.
Java Card debugging is a slow low level process. The deployment of a minor change
takes minutes and the results are often two byte codes, which might be standardized,
application-dependent or both. It is unsuitable to test by itself cryptographic function-
ality. The resulting decision was the design of a brand new Java application that would
communicate with the Java Card only when it was strictly necessary.
The interface Broker was designed to represent a party in a threshold protocol. The
class BasicElGamalJavaBroker extends from it in a simple implementation of traditional
ElGamal.
The second implementation, ThresholdElGamalJavaBroker, implemented the beha-
vior of an actor Ai within Pedersen's protocol. For the communication between diﬀerent
brokers, a bulletin board was implemented. A bulletin board B is an abstract concept
present in online voting protocols that contains all the messages exchanged between the
parties. A bulletin board supports the abstract functions append and search, but not
delete or edit.
Since the nature of the messages in the bulletin board is so diverse, the bulletin
board was divided into a set of subjects, deﬁned in the Enumeration BBT. That way, the
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functionality of the bulletin board was deﬁned:
Algorithm 7: BulletinBoard.addMessage
input : BBT tag, Message newMessage
output : none. The message newMessage is now attached to the subject
identiﬁed by tag
1 B[tag]← B[tag] ∪ {newMessage}
Algorithm 8: BulletinBoard.getSubject
input : BBT tag
output : subject
1 subject← B[tag]
The reading functionality in B was designed to return all the messages associated
with one tag (e.g. all the messages with the tag PUBLIC_KEY_SHARE_TAG are to be used
together to calculate the public key).
The creation of the bulletin board made it possible to keep track of the communic-
ation between the brokers, since no message can be exchanged between them in any
other way. Diﬀerent instances of Message were created, out of which SimpleMessage
and SecretMessage are the most important. SimpleMessage contains a byte array and
SecretMessage contains another Message that can only be read by an intended broker.
Whereas for a real scenario SecretMessage would encrypt-and-sign the message, this
implementation focused on functionality and oﬀers no real security to the message.
The ﬁnal phase of the development involved the creation of the class ThresholdEl-
GamalJavaCardBroker, which ported the key generation part of the ThresholdElGamal-
JavaBroker to the Java Card.
The implementation was tested with a (3, 5)−threshold where one of the Brokers was
a ThresholdElGamalJavaCardBroker and the other 4 ThresholdElGamalJavaBroker.
The implementation succeeded both when the Java Card broker was used to reconstruct
the key and when it contributed only to the creation of the secret.
4.4.4 Performance
As described in the previous sections, the key generation protocol implemented is essen-
tially similar to the version developed by the CRISES group. The main diﬀerence lies on
the amount of cards used to calculate the secret, and since that task can be performed in
parallel in a system designed to provide almost constant time performance, the total time
of the key generation is not likely to increase. The time for veriﬁcation of commitments,
however, should increase by a factor of n.
Thus, the results provided by the CRISES group for their approach are not likely to
increase by several orders of magnitude. Their results for the trusted dealer approach,
aggregating the result for diﬀerent key sizes, were:
Operation Performance range (minutes)
Generation of 5 shares 5.56 to 20.10
Veriﬁcation of a share 1.14 to 4.26
Encryption of 1 message 0.42 to 1.25
Decryption of 1 message 0.27 to 0.70
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Since the performance overhead will occur during the key generation phase and will
not increase by several orders of magnitude, the viability of the process remains intact.
The performance-intensive operations can be performed in advance and will not have
repercussions during the election process.
The current implementation of the system contains a non-veriﬁable version of the
process. In other words, it does neither calculate nor verify commitments. The non-
veriﬁable share generation process takes in average 95 seconds to generate 5 3-threshold
shares, with an error margin of at most 10 seconds.
4.4.5 Solution Analysis
The solutions 1 and 2 were identiﬁed as inviable or insuﬃcient before they were evaluated
in terms of the framework deﬁned in section 4.1. However, this last solution was imple-
mented and is feasible as long as a non-decryption-intensive voting scheme is introduced.
The next step is to analyze the solution from the security point of view.
- Random number generation: depends on the smart card. Java Card supports two
algorithms, ALG_PSEUDO_RANDOM and ALG_SECURE_RANDOM. The Feitian Java Card
supports both, and the implementation makes use of ALG_SECURE_RANDOM.
- Veriﬁable correctness of the generator: the key generation can be certiﬁed in some
Java Cards for standard algorithms. There are no known certiﬁcations for smart card
environments that certify ElGamal implementations, or threshold implementations
in particular.
- Encrypted transport: the protocol establishes a secure authenticated channel between
TCBs to exchange the secret shares that can be used to decrypt the secret.
- Access control: the right to calculate and use a secret share is given in this scheme
by the physical possession of the smart card. A PIN code can be used as a second
factor of authentication.
- The key cannot be used by an unauthorized actor or group: t cards are required to
perform a decryption, reducing the impact of the loss of one card.
- Tampering protection: a share must be consistent with the published commitments
in order to be used, and there are n − t cards that can be used as a replacement
if the secret in one of them is tampered with. After the reconstruction, the key is
exposed.
- Resilience: The system can tolerate up to n− t failures (accidental or intentional)
and resist the collusion of groups of at most t−1 authorized users. For a ﬁxed value
n of authorized users, the selection of t constitutes a trade-oﬀ between conﬁdenti-
ality and resiliency. After the key is reconstructed, if the key is tampered with or
destroyed, it can be reconstructed again. However, it can no longer be considered
a shared secret, as it existed in its reconstructed state in a less secure container.
The protocol does not contemplate the creation of additional shares (in case of loss
or failure, for instance), but it is possible to design it.
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- The key can be destroyed irreversibly: the key disposal procedure is not deﬁned by
the protocol. The shares should be deleted from the smart cards and the recon-
structed copy securely deleted from its trusted container.
Result: assuming a correct implementation and the selection of a reliable Java Card
provider with the right supported features, the scheme can resist the collusion of up to
t− 1 authorized parties and the loss of up to n− t shares. After the key reconstruction,
however, the security of the scheme is limited to the security of the trusted container
used to calculate the secret key.
Additional security controls should be added to harden access control, resilience and
the secure deletion of the key.
4.5 Result Comparison
As the design options 1 and 2 were found to be inviable under the conditions established,
it is only worthwhile to compare the design option 3 against the current HSM approach.
The oﬃcial characteristics of the HSM were summarized at the beginning of this chapter,
whereas the security analysis of the design option 3 was the subject of section 4.4.5.
Since the HSM results are described in terms of the functionality of the hardware and the
suggested option in terms of the key management framework deﬁned in section 4.1, the
following section will summarize the eﬀects of migrating from an HSM to a smart card
based approach.
4.5.1 Unchanged Features
HSMs and smart cards are both hardware implementations designed to execute crypto-
graphic operations within a hardened environment. It is possible to acquire hardware
with similar FIPS 140-2 and Common Criteria security certiﬁcations for both systems,
and both are used to support security-critical processes. Likewise, although the set of
speciﬁc algorithms is vendor-dependent, the standardization and compatibility of cryp-
tographic algorithms is high.
4.5.2 New Features
The Java Card scheme introduces a stronger variant of secret sharing that reduces the
reliance on a single point of failure, although it does not remove it entirely. The tech-
nology enables the generation of zero knowledge proofs as well as the implementation of
homomorphic encryption algorithms.
The overall cost of the process is reduced and the resilience of the process is preserved,
if not strengthened, due to the nature of the threshold protocol. Nevertheless, the most
signiﬁcant feature achieved is ﬂexibility: the possibility of implementing and executing
arbitrary (if limited) protocols is of utmost importance in an environment where the
majority of the most powerful protocols are not readily available.
4.5.3 Impacted Features
The main feature aﬀected by the Java Card alternative is the performance of crypto-
graphic operations. As a result, the variety of voting schemes that can be supported at
a nation-wide scale is severely limited.
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Other features that can be impacted are tamper evidence and availability, as HSMs
are designed to be heavy duty hardware and smart cards are not.
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5 Conclusion and Future Work
This document described the analysis of alternative key management strategies suitable
for the scenario of nation-wide legally binding online voting. The alternatives evaluated
aimed at the use of smart cards as a low cost secure provider of cryptographic function-
alities and key storage. A qualitative framework to evaluate key storage strategies was
deﬁned.
While early results already revealed that cryptographic batch operations are not feas-
ible on the existent smart card hardware, the work of the CRISES group in 2013 had
proven that an implementation of threshold decryption in smart cards is possible. This
document described how that work was extended to remove the ﬁgure of the trusted
dealer, although it still needs a trusted party to calculate the secret.
Despite the promising result from the functionality point of view, there is a wide range
of open questions that need to be addressed before their results can be considered for a
practical usage. Some of them build upon the results of the present document, whereas
some constitute orthogonal directions towards the ﬁnal objective. The ﬁnal paragraphs
of this document will attempt to identify and classify them.
5.1 Non-standard cryptography and smart card development
Security certiﬁcations can be misleading. A smart card certiﬁed on FIPS 140-2 may
be designed to be resistant against side channel attacks, but only for the supported al-
gorithms. The software implementation of unsupported cryptographic primitives may be
ignoring the assumptions on which the security of the smart card is built, and therefore
enabling subtle and dangerous vulnerabilities.
Furthermore, cryptography is a ﬁeld where peer review is essential to prevent minor
bugs from becoming catastrophic vulnerabilities. However, there are no standardization
attempts or even notation agreements when it comes to functionality for zero knowledge
proofs, commitments and other primitives essential to MPC. This is true even for major
programming languages (where there are a few unmaintained projects), and specially
critical for low level implementations. If every implementation of these protocols must
begin by designing how to encode a share, the applicability of the research in this ﬁeld
will progress at a very slow rate.
This call for building blocks is even more urgent in the case of Java Card, where even
arithmetic operations must be redeﬁned before implementing any actual functionality. In
fact, the suitability of Java Card as a development platform for cryptographic function-
ality should be evaluated. Should the cost in terms of low level thinking, slow coding
rate, learning curve, cryptic debugging and uncertain security expectations be considered
unacceptable for productive scenarios? If that is the case, what would be the alternative?
Is the design of a smart card with native support for these operations a viable alternative?
5.2 Threshold decryption in online voting scenarios
The security assumption of the voting protocol was weakened in this project to the point
where the key is decentralized until it needs to be calculated for decryption. Since a
scheme with no trusted dealer was implemented, the hardening of that assumption can
be attempted, for instance by introducing the idea of threshold decryption. Is it possible
to design a voting scheme that satisﬁes the following requirements?
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1. Distributed Key Generation with untrusted dealer
2. Threshold decryption (i.e. without key reconstruction)
3. Execution of critical operations directly on smart cards (or equivalently secure hard-
ware)
4. Practical for a nation-wide election process (from the results of this document, this
implies that it must not be decryption-intensive)
5. Eﬃciently veriﬁable
5.3 The general key management problem
Since key management is mostly a qualitative information security concern at the core
of the eminently mathematical discipline of cryptography, is it possible to quantify the
quality of an information security approach? Can the parameters introduced in the
qualitative framework in this document be weighed to bear diﬀerent relevance under
diﬀerent cryptographic scenarios?
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A Notation Summary
A.1 Basic Notation
Symbol Meaning
⊕ Group addition
⊗ Group multiplication
∀ For all
g Group generator
p, q Arbitrary prime numbers
Pr[x] Probability of event x
Zp Modular group of size p
x← y Assign the value y to the variable x
x
$←− X Assign a random value from the set X to the variable x
X \ Y The set X without the elements in Y
x ∈ X The element x is in the set X
x 6∈ X The element x is NOT in the set X
X ⊂ Y The set X is a proper subset of the set Y
X ⊆ Y The set X is a subset of the set Y
A.2 Basic Cryptographic Functions
Symbol Meaning
c Encrypted message
EncA(m) The encryption of the message m with the public key of the user A
h ElGamal public key
k Generic cryptographic key
K Key space. Set of possible values of a key
m Plaintext message
pk Public key
pkA Public key associated to the user A
r Random value
SigA(m) The signature of the message m with the private key of the user A
sk Secret key
skA Secret key associated to the user A
x ElGamal private key
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A.3 Secret Sharing
Symbol Meaning
A Authorized shareholders
Ai i-th authorized shareholder
ai i-th polynomial coeﬃcient
a∗,i Set of polynomial coeﬃcients of Ai
aj,i j-th polynomial coeﬃcient of Ai
C Commitment or set of related commitments
n Total amount of shares generated
t Threshold. Amount of shares required to perform an operation
s Secret value
S Set of n shares of a secret
Si Set of shares of a secret generated by Ai
si i-th share, expressed as a point (xi, yi)
sj,i j-th share generated by Ai, expressed as a point (xj,i, yj,i)
xi x component of si
yi y component of si
A.4 Online Voting
Symbol Meaning
B Bulletin board
Bi Part of the bulletin board corresponding to Vi
l Set of candidates
L Amount of candidates
M Maximum amount of votes possible for a single candidate
T Tally
V Ordered set of voters that voted
Vi Unique id of the i-th voter
v Ordered set of votes
vi Vote of Vi
A.5 Others
Symbol Meaning
srvi i-th server in a set of servers
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B Acronyms
Acronym Meaning
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
CAST Carlisle Adams Staﬀord Tavares
CSPRNG Cryptographically Secure PRNG
CTR CounTeR [encryption operation mode]
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DKG Distributed Key Generation
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EC Elliptic Curve
ECDH EC Diﬃe-Hellman
ECDSA EC Digital Signature Algorithm
ECIES EC Integrated Encryption Scheme
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
HSM Hardware Security Module
IDEA International Data Encryption Algorithm
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organization for Standardization
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD5 Message Digest [Algorithm] 5
MPC Multi-Party Computation
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures
OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards
PRNG Pseudo-Random Number Generator
RAM Random Access Memory
RC2/RC4/RC5 Rivest Cipher 2/4/5
RFC Request For Comments
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman [cryptosystem]
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSL Secure Socket Layer
TCB Trusted Computing Base
TPM Trusted Platform Module
VSS Veriﬁable Secret Sharing
ZKP Zero Knowledge Proof
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C Basic Building Blocks
This document contains references to several basic cryptographic primitives, such as
encryption, digital signature and commitments. Although they are not the focus of
this work, their deﬁnitions are provided for completeness. The security parameters and
security deﬁnitions for each of them are unspeciﬁed, as they may change for diﬀerent
scenarios in which they are applied.
C.1 Public Key Encryption
A public key encryption scheme PK is deﬁned by three algorithms, PK.KeyGeneration,
PK.Encryption, PK.Decryption. Speciﬁcally:
PK.KeyGeneration produces a key pair (sk, pk), where sk is secret and pk is public.
Given a message m, PK.Encryption(pk,m) returns c, an encryption of m that can
only be decrypted by the holder of sk.
Conversely, PK.Decryption(sk, c) = m.
Encryption ensures mainly that only the authorized recipient will read the message.
Speciﬁc encryption schemes are designed to support additional security properties. In
this document, PK.Encryption and PK.Decryption are abbreviated as Encpk(m) and
Decsk(c).
C.2 Digital Signature
PK can be extended to support integrity by deﬁning two additional algorithms: PK.Sign
and PK.Verify:
PK.Sign(sk,m) produces the signature sig of the hash value of m.
PK.Verify(pk,m, sig) returns 1 iﬀ sig is a valid signature of the message m by the
owner of sk.
A digital signature is produced to certify the authenticity and integrity of m.
C.3 ElGamal Cryptosystem
ElGamal is a public key cryptosystem based on the discrete logarithm assumption, of-
ten used as the basic scheme for more complex schemes (including homomorphic and
threshold schemes). It is deﬁned for both prime integer and elliptic curve groups. The
integer version is deﬁned as follows (only key generation, encryption and decryption are
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relevant for the current document. Signature generation and veriﬁcation is out of scope):
Algorithm 9: ElGamal.KeyGeneration
input : q, g
output: sk, pk
1 x
$←− Zq;
2 h← gx;
3 sk, pk ← x, h;
Algorithm 10: ElGamal.Encryption
input : q, g, pk,m ∈ Zq
output: c
1 r
$←− Zq;
2 c1 ← gr;
3 c2 ← m · pkr;
4 c← (c1, c2)
Algorithm 11: ElGamal.Decryption
input : q, g, sk, c
output: m
1 m← c2 · c−sk1
C.4 Commitments
In MPC protocols, a threat model known as the malicious model assumes that all parties
can misbehave by deviating from a protocol. One of these malicious behaviors consists
of changing their output according to the output of the other parties. In scenarios where
that situation is not desirable, each party must commit to a value before they are revealed.
A Commitment then has three phases: Commitment.KeyGeneration generates a public
key pk. Commitment.Commitpk(m, r) produces a value C that commits to a message m
and takes a random value r. Commitment.Openpk takes a tuple (m,C, r) and returns 1
iﬀ C =Commitment.Commitpk(m, r) and 0 otherwise. In other words, it veriﬁes if the
commitment is valid for the claimed value of m.
There are three security properties for a commitment:
- Completeness: it is well deﬁned for every possible input.
- [Computationally] Hiding: the commitment C does not leak information about the
value m to a [polynomial] adversary.
- Binding: A commitment cannot be opened for a value m′ 6= m.
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